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NOTES
A POSSIBLE REMEDY FOR UNTHINKING
DISCRIMINATION
"I know it's universal,... but the fact that it is universal doesn't
mean that I'll accept it."
INTRODUCTION: WHY LAW CAN AND SHOULD ADDRESS
UNTHINKING DISCRIMINATION
Racial inequality persists in the United States despite
laws against racial discrimination. It might be that civil rights
laws often go unenforced; it might be that current inequities
spring from past prejudice and longstanding economic differ-
ences that are not entirely reachable by law; or it might be
that the law sometimes fails to reflect, and consequently fails
to correct, the barriers faced by people of color.2 Probably all
James Baldwin from JAMES BALDWIN & MARGARET MEAD, A RAP ON RACE:
256 (1971).
' Commentators have argued that the law fails in various ways to address
racial discrimination as it actually occurs. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (the United
States Constitution is neither egalitarian nor color-blind, school-deseogregation falls
as the fulcrum for racial justice); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991) (law fails to recognize and deal with American ocdety's perva-
sive racism); Alexander T. Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1060 (1990) (color-blind jurisprudence cannot correct racism in a color-con-
scious society); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Interocction of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139 (the 'single.axis" fram work
employed by courts to analyze barriers faced by black women as merely the sum
of racism and sexism fails to describe their experience); Barbara J. Flagg, 'Wa
Blind, but Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Diccrimi-
natory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (colorblindness is not a neutral princi-
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three are true. This Note explores the third possibility.
Considerable evidence indicates that Americans continue
to apply racial stereotypes without realizing that they are
perpetuating racial inequality.' Decisions to fire or promote an
employee or to accept or reject a prospective tenant are likely
to be influenced by this kind of unthinking prejudice.4 Yet, de-
pie, but rather encodes the perspective of whites in discrimination law); Alan D.
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (discrim-
ination law's "perpetrator perspective" delegitimizes the experience of victims of
discrimination and ignores the actual status of Black Americans, and thus fails to
reduce prejudice); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (ignorance, fear, and denial create a legal
blindspot about unconscious racism and thus inhibit the law from correcting racial
disparities in criminal law, especially in capital cases); Charles R. Lawrence IT,
The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (interpreting the Constitutional principle of equality to
outlaw only purposefully discriminatory conduct overlooks and thus fails to correct
unconsciously racist conduct); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimina-
tion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (requiring purposeful intent in discrimination
law excludes unconscious racist conduct that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted to outlaw); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of
Contracts, 29 HARV. C!M.-CL. L. REV. 63 (1994) (by focusing on subjective intent,
current equal protection law uses a distorted analysis of legislative decisionmaking,
and fails to correct discriminatory laws); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of
Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 323 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990)
(rhetorical moves used to justify racism in discredited nineteenth-century cases are
still employed by the Supreme Court).
' National opinion surveys indicate that while the vast majority of white
Americans favor the principle of nondiscrimination in the abstract, more than half
continue to believe that blacks are less intelligent, less hard-working and more
violence-prone than whites. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 904-07. In another legal
context, simulated jury deliberations, tests show evidence of bias along racial ste-
reotypes. One researcher found that "stereotypic biases may occur automatically or
without conscious awareness even by persons who would not endorse racist be-
liefs." Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and
Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY AND SOc.
PSYCHOL. 726, 735 (1988) (citations omitted).
' David R. Oppenheimer contrasts the findings of two opinion surveys. The
surveys show that, on the one hand, 97% of white Americans polled believe that
blacks "should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job," but
on the other hand, majorities of whites believe that blacks are less intelligent
(53%) and lazier (62%) than whites. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 904-09 (citing
HOWARD SCHUMAN Err AL., RACIAL ATITIUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRE-
TATIONS 74-75 tbl. 3.1 and 9 tbl 1 (1988)). Oppenheimer points out that together
these surveys predict that a white employer, while almost certain to espouse poli-
cies of nondiscrimination, is more likely than not to view black employees and job
applicants as less intelligent and hardworking than whites. Oppenheimer, eupra
note 2, at 909.
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spite growing recognition of the problem of "unconscious rac-
ism,"5 when individual decisions by employers or housing pro-
viders are challenged as discriminatory, the law is usually read
to require proof of conscious racist intent in order to establish
liability.6
This Note proposes interpreting existing discrimination
law to encompass the unwitting' application of racial stereo-
types. The proposed approach broadens the concept of inten-
tional discrimination to include a person's reliance on racial
stereotypes, conscious or not. Maintaining some form of inten-
tional standard for individual discriminatory behavior seems
important. Without it, the alleged discriminatory action lacks
the defining element of expressed racial meaning.
Discriminatory intent, however, need not be in the
discriminator's consciousness at the time of the action. Instead,
the proposed theory locates discriminatory intent in the mean-
ing of the stereotype applied.8
In his groundbreakdng article, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, Charles I. Lawrence IT identified the problem of
unconscious racism. Lawrence analyzed remarks by public figures that appeared to
invoke racial stereotypes unintentionally, and pointed out that putative compli-
ments by whites, who tell black friends that they "did not think of them as Ne-
groes," are examples of "unconscious racism." Lawrence, cupra note 2, at 3404L
Lawrence cited the work of psychologist Joel Kovel, who developed a psychological
profile of unconscious racism. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 335. Kovel described a
psychology of "aversive racism," which involves an "intrapsychic battle" between
racist sentiments and conscience by individuals who are only "more or less aware
of their belief in white superiority. JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYcHoH1SToRY,
54-55 (1970). Lawrence argued that such individuals regularly employ racist stereo-
types in their thinking and act on them without knowing what they are doing.
Lawrence, supra note 2, at 322.
1 In some claims for employment or housing discrimination, liability can be
established by proving that facially neutral policies have a "disparate impact" on a
protected class. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 US. 324, 335
n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under disparate
impact."). Unless plaintiffs have access to comparative data that establishes a
discriminatory pattern, however, they must proceed under a disparate treatment
theory, which requires proof of intentional discrimination. For a more detailed
explanation of the different theories currently used in housing and employment
discrimination cases, see infra Section lB and accompanying notes 32-42.
7 I have chosen to use several adjectives to express the form of discrimination
that this Note addresses. It is variously described as unwitting, unconscious, un-
thinking, unintentional, thoughtless, careless, and subliminal. I think that using
different modifiers better expresses the shifty and elusive nature of this problem
than picking one inadequate descriptor and repeating it to give it authority.
I Lawrence proposes using a "cultural meaning" test to trigger a more caarch.
"19951 1301
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
An objective standard of intent for discriminatory treat-
ment could create liability for employment and housing dis-
crimination not captured by a subjective intentional standard.
In so doing, it would also encourage increased awareness of the
ways subtle attitudes about race drive prejudicial decisions
that harm individuals and intensify racial conflict. Most impor-
tant, a legal theory of unthinking discrimination would more
accurately express the way much racial discrimination today
really functions, i.e., through behavior that cannot be described
as" subjectively purposeful. Because unconscious as well as
conscious race prejudice damages American society, laws en-
couraging self reflection about racial attitudes seem more like-
ly to improve race relations than legal standards that reward
individuals for denying the influence of race on their actions.
Part I of this Note surveys the doctrinal development of
intent standards in discrimination law and looks at how intent
functions in individual discrimination cases under Title VII
and Title VIII. Part II considers the possibility of using a neg-
ligence theory to address unthinking discrimination. A negli-
gence approach seems promising at first, because negligence is
a well-developed legal doctrine that assigns liability for unin-
tentional actions.9 Ultimately, though, a negligence analysis is
not well suited to determining liability that must still be based
somehow on an action's meaning, if not on the actor's conscious
purpose. Some form of intentional standard is needed to identi-
fy the behavior's discriminatory meaning."° A negligence stan-
ing review of government actions in race-based equal protection claims. He sug-
gests asking whether societal attitudes about race had influenced the governmental
actor's decision. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 328. The inferred intent test proposed
by this Note also boils down to an objective inquiry into the discriminatory mean-
ing of the challenged action. I hope to show, however, that such a test can be
developed out of the practical effect of the proof structure already in place in dis-
parate treatment cases. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text. Concep.
tually, the inferred intent standard also springs from the analysis used in adver-
tising claims in housing discrimination law. There, the test is whether an ordinary
reader would understand the ad as suggesting a racial preference. Ragin v. New
York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEION ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
28 (5th ed. 1984). In his recent article, Oppenheimer proposed creating a negli-
gence action for employment discrimination. See Oppenheimer, supra note 2.
10 The need for an intentional standard reflects the view that an individual's
discriminatory decision is always a violation of dignitary rights, a blow to an
individual's humanity involving a lack of respect that seems necessarily intention-
al. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 722-23 (1992) ("Usually
[Vol. 61: 1299
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dard of discrimination would also raise problematic policy is-
sues, because the definition of a reasonable standard of care
would also entail a definition of nonnegligent, or "reasonable"
discrimination." Though ultimately unsatisfactory, the negli-
gence analysis illuminates two key requirements for a work-
able objective standard to address individual unthinking dis-
crimination. The standard must have a capacity to capture the
expressive, or meaningful, quality of discrimination without
resorting to subjective intent, and offer a principled way to
assign liability for every identified instance of discrimination.
Part HI suggests a way to develop a doctrine of objective
discriminatory intent, by drawing on the "ordinary reader"
standard applied by some courts in actions for discriminatory
advertising.' The use of an objective standard for discrimina-
tion in the advertising context shows that it is possible, within
current legal discrimination doctrine, to identify individual
discriminatory actions without inquiring into subjective intent.
Part IV proposes an objective standard, inferred intent, to
address individual employment and housing discrimination
based on unconscious racial stereotypes. This part argues that
a basis for applying an inferred intent standard is already in
place in the form of the indirect proof structure now used in
disparate treatment claims. This indirect proof structure may
already encompass some unconscious discrimination as a basis
for liability. Furthermore, the use of an indirect proof structure
for disparate treatment is best explained by the fact that dis-
criminatory intent is not always conscious. Discrimination law
should substantively embrace the tendency of established dis-
parate treatment procedure to assign liability for unconscious
discrimination. Failing to acknowledge that the indirect proof
structure sweeps in some cases of unconscious discrimination
can only undermine confidence in that structure. It may then
become more difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to
the real injury suffered by plaintiffs [in housing discrimination cases] is the deep
humiliation of racial rejection that is no less painful because it is deemed to be an
intangible hmn... Damage to the autonomy and freedom of action--the badges
and incidents of citizenship-is the threshold damage which always occurs in a
race discrimination case. .. ").
I ]KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 31, at 170 ('conduct, to be negligent, must
be unreasonable.").
I' Ragin v. New York Times, 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
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prove conscious as well as unconscious discrimination.
Courts should recognize that a standard of inferred intent
is evolving out of the indirect proof method already used in
disparate treatment cases. Explicitly adopting this objective
standard could create a socially responsive, principled cause of
action for unthinking discrimination in housing and employ-
ment decisions.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF INTENT IN DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII AND TITLE VIII
A person who believes an employer or landlord has dis-
criminated against her because of race can bring suit under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)13 or the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 (Title VIII).14 Title VII makes it illegal for an em-
ployer to fire, refuse to hire or promote, or in any way limit an
employee's compensation or job conditions "because of such
individual's race.... "15 Under Title VIII it is illegal "to refuse
to sell or rent ... or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race.... ."6
The Supreme Court gives the key phrase "because of race"
two distinct meanings, each of which corresponds to a different
theory of liability: disparate treatment, which requires proof of
intent, and disparate impact, which does not.17 Disparate im-
pact claims, however, often require statistical evidence to show
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1988).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
'6 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
17 The Court described the two causes of action in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (saying that in disparate treat-
ment, the defendant "simply treats some people less favorably than others because
of their race .... Proof of discriminatory motive is critical," whereas, claims of
disparate impact involve "practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive .... is
not required under disparate impact."). Id. at 335 n.15. The 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 assert that "an unlawful employment practice based
on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if a complaining
party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
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the differential effect of specific challenged policies on different
racial groups. 8 It takes considerable resources to gather and
analyze the quantitative data generally needed to prove a dis-
criminatory effect, and consequently disparate impact actions
are less common than disparate treatment claims and often
not pursued by individual discrimination plaintiffs. 9 The per-
son who believes that she has lost out on a job or apartment
because of her race will ordinarily bring a disparate treatment
claim, which entails proving discriminatory intent. The stan-
dard of intent that applies is thus a key question in most legal
definitions of individual discrimination.
A. The Intent Standard in Disparate Treatment Claims
Disparate treatment claims are the garden variety cases
brought by individuals who believe that an employer or land-
lord rejected them because of race.' To prove disparate treat-
ment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally
discriminated.2' In a disparate treatment action under either
Title VII or Title VIH, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie
case by proving that (1) she is a member of a racial minority;
(2) she is qualified for the job or housing opportunity in ques-
tion; (3) she was rejected; and (4) the employment or housing
opportunity remained open after she was rejected. The law
presumes that proof of these elements rules out the most com-
mon legitimate reasons for the plaintiffs rejection-that she
" Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 ("our cases make it dear that statistical analyses
have served and will continue to serve an important role in cases in which the
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue").
" For instance, in Teamsters, the government brought statistical evidence to
show that the employer engaged in system wide discrimination, comparing the
number and percentage of various types of jobs held by race and ethnidty with
the racial/ethnic breakdown of the population in several different cities where the
company operated. Id. at 337-38 & n.17.
21 Intent is also needed for all discrimination claims brought under the con-
stitutional theory of equal protection. Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 274 (1979) ("even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect
upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose").
21 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
('The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intention-
ally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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was not qualified or that there actually was no job or housing
opportunity available.'
Once a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the
defendant made the challenged decision because of race.24 The
employer or housing provider must provide an alternative
legitimate reason for the decision, or else the plaintiff is enti-
tled to judgement. The defendant, however, can merely proffer
the explanation; he is not required to prove his alternate rea-
son in order to prevail at this point.' Once the defendant of-
fers a legitimate reason for the challenged decision, the plain-
tiff must still prove that, despite what defendant says, the
decision in fact was based on intentional race discrimina-
tion.26 To understand the importance and the ambiguity of
the standard of intent that is applied in these cases, one needs
to examine how the role of intent has changed as discrimina-
tion law has developed.
B. The Doctrinal Development of Discriminatory Intent
Legal definitions of discrimination have not always cen-
tered on intent. In 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education,2
finally overturned the rule of "separate but equal,"a the
' Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. ("Although the McDonnell Douglas formula
does not require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand that the alleged
discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two
most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job
applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy
in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient,
absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discrimi-
natory one.").
See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
26 Id. See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text regarding the nature and
effect of the shifted burden of production in disparate treatment cases.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), a black man was arrested for
riding in the whites-only car of a Louisiana train. Plessy thus concerns a law that
today would be the paradigm of discrimination because it explicitly uses the cate-
gory of race to limit conduct. The infamous Plessy ruling, however, upheld the law
of "separate but equal" accommodations because the Court disclaimed any evidence
that segregation sprang from the ill will of whites or created objectively unfavor-
able conditions for blacks. Id. at 551 In other words, the Court found neither
discriminatory intent nor discriminatory effect. Instead the Court located the dis-
1306 [Vol. 61: 1299
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Court stressed the stigmatic effect segregated schools had on
black children.' The Brown opinion cited extensive empirical
evidence for its finding of psychological injury, with no mention
of discriminatory intent." Nevertheless, it is clear that this
kind of stigmatic effect could not exist without the intentional,
or at least the meaningful, message from the schools to the
children that segregation was a response to black inferiority.3
It was the first Supreme Court case under Title VII that
articulated a clear distinction between effect and intent as
different doctrinal bases of liability. In that case, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,32 a 1971 employment discrimination action,
effect analysis temporarily took precedence.' Emphasizing
criminatory meaning of the law entirely in the minds of the excluded black citi-
zens: "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construc-
tion upon it." I&
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
SId.
31 Even though the Court in Brown did not explicitly locate the stigmatic
meaning of school segregation in the conscious subjective intent of the school
board members, it is clear that those board members, and by extension the local
governments they represented, bore responsibility for the discriminatory message
conveyed. If the discriminatory meaning of segregation was entirely located in the
fantasies of the affected children and their parents, the Court could not have or-
dered redress no matter how bad the psychological effects were.
2 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" Griggs was a class action brought by black workers at a North Carolina
power plant. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plant officially segregated
workers by race. The year after the Act passed, the company instituted two new
requirements for jobs in the previously all.white categories: a high-.zchool diploma
and a company-administered aptitude test. The plaintiffs brought evidence to show
that in North Carolina only 12% of black men had graduated from high school, as
compared with 34% of their white counterparts. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. Thus, the
company's educational requirements disadvantaged blacks.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that despite the proven obstacle for black em-
ployees created by the new requirements, the employer had not discriminated
under Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970). That
court said that in determining liability under Title V1 "a subjective test of the
employer's intent should govern. .. and that in this case there was no showing
of discriminatory purpose... . Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428. A unanimous Supreme
Court overturned the decision below. The Court held that [t]he [Civil Rights] Act
prescribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be relat-
ed to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Despite its emphasis on discriminatory effect, the Griggs opinion stopped short
1995] 1307
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the centrality of unequal effect for determining discrimination
liability, the court declared that the Civil Rights Act was di-
rected at "the consequences of employment practices, not sim-
ply the motivation."' The dominance of impact analysis,
however, was brief. In a 1976 employment case, Washington v.
Davis,' the Court ruled that liability for discriminatory effect
without evidence of intent did not apply in equal protection
cases,36 and the intentional standard of Davis was soon ex-
tended to claims of discriminatory treatment brought under
Title VII and Title VIII' The standard of intent required,
of holding that intent plays no part in this type of case. The Court cautioned that,
"[w]e do not suggest that [the courts below] erred in examining the employer's
intent," and stressed that the company in this case had been purposefully discrim.
inating on the basis of race prior to the Civil Rights Act's passage. Id. Griggs
forbids "unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. The
question is whether that invidiousness comes strictly from the barrier's economic
impact on blacks and segregative effect on the workforce or also from a presumed
discriminatory intent on the part of the employer who put the barriers in place.
There is no question that Griggs holds that proof of intent is not needed to
create liability in a disparate impact case. In terms of the legal definition of dis-
crimination, though, the interesting question is why such proof is not required: Is
it because the negative effect on the black workers itself constitutes discrimina-
tion? Or is it because, in the absence of a justification of business necessity, that
effect indicates the likelihood that the employer is intentionally, or at least lmow.
ingly, acting to disadvantage blacks?
Another case the Court decided the same year as Griggs emphasized the
triumph of effect analysis over intent in the definition of discrimination. In Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Court examined a decision by the city of
Jackson, Mississippi to close down all its public swimming pools, rather than inte-
grate them. The Court openly acknowledged that the city council had a discrimina-
tory motive, but held that the policy affected blacks and whites equally. The Court
decided that discriminatory motive alone did not make the council's decision a
violation of equal protection. Id. As one commentator has remarked, with the
Palmer decision, "[e]ffect was at its zenith" Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1151, 1157 (1991).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
36 Id. at 242 (stating that "[disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.").
' The Davis decision was reaffirmed in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which held that a white
suburb's refusal to rezone in order to allow developers to build a low-income hous-
ing project could not violate equal protection solely because of the zoning decision's
segregative effect. Id. On remand, the 7th Circuit held that under the disparate
impact theory, the village was liable for discrimination under Title VIII. Metro-
politan Housing Dey. Corp. v. village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.
1308 (Vol. 61: 1299
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however, remained uncertain until 1979, when Personnel Ad-
ministrator v. Feeney' supplied this last piece of the intent
doctrine.
Feeney involved a Massachusetts statute that created an
absolute civil service job preference for veterans, thereby
disadvantaging women, who were much less likely to have
served in the armed forces. Though the legislature had
knowingly sacrificed women's interests, the Court held that it
had not purposefully discriminated.40 The Court explained
that "discriminatory purpose... implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 1 It is
this standard of purposeful intent-rather than a passive
awareness of discriminatory effect--that currently applies in
disparate treatment actions.42
C. Purposeful Intent and the Treatment/Effect Dichotomy
The narrow deliberate-purpose definition of intent may be
necessary to maintain the distinction between disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact claims. This is certainly true if the
intentional standard is a subjective one. If courts applied a
broader tort standard of subjective intent, then "knowledge to
substantial certainty" that a policy or decision would have a
1975). The Court identified four factors that were important in Title VIII impact
cases: (1) the strength of the evidence of effect; (2) evidence of intent (3)
defendant's interest in making the challenged decision; and (4) whether plaintiff
sought positive action by defendant to provide them with housing or merely to
stop defendant from blocking their own housing efforts. BELL, suprm note 10, at
794. Note that with the second criterion, the Court again refused to entirely re-
move intent as a condition for liability in a disparate impact case.
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 279.
Although proof of intent is not required in disparate impact actions, some
concept of implied intent may also underlie liability in these cases. Proof of diapa-
rate impact is sometimes conceived of as simply a proxy for proof of intent. That
is, where a strong pattern of disparate impact is found, discriminatory intent is
sometimes assumed. But see United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d fl79,
1185 (8th Cir. 1974). ('The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the
action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated.").
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discriminatory effect would also constitute discriminatory in-
tent.43 In the current structure of discrimination law, this
broader definition could conflate discriminatory effect with
intent and collapse disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims back into a single theory.
The prima facie case for a disparate impact claim general-
ly consists of statistical evidence that something an employer
or housing provider is doing tends to disadvantage members of
one racial group. Imagine that instead of going straight to
court with their statistical evidence, disparate impact plaintiffs
first showed it to the employers or housing providers whose
actions were implicated. Because proven disproportionate im-
pact constitutes a form of discrimination, once the companies
are made aware of it, under a tort standard of knowing intent,
they are guilty of intentional discrimination if they continue
the same behavior. Since they know that their actions are hav-
ing a disparate effect, they are intentionally discriminating.44
Currently, defendants in cases brought on a disparate
impact theory can escape liability for proven discriminatory
effects by showing that the policies creating the harm can be
justified as a "business necessity."45 If, however, defendants'
knowledge of discriminatory impact converted their actions
into intentional discrimination, it would be difficult to justify
such immunity. The courts have never held that a business
rationale, however pressing, can cancel liability for intentional
discrimination.46 Thus, limiting liability for subjective dis-
criminatory intent to active purpose, rather than mere knowl-
edge of an action's certain results, maintains a sharp distinc-
tion between discriminatory effect and treatment. That distinc-
tion, in turn, immunizes policies which may severely disad-
vantage a particular racial group but which are "necessary" for
the sake of business. As long as the intent standard is con-
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 8A cmt. b (1965). "Intent is not ...
limited te consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequenc-
es are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead,
he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result." Id.
"Id.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
4 The Court has suggested that the lack of a business justification for an
ostensibly neutral policy that has a discriminatory effect may indicate intentional
discrimination. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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ceived of as purely subjective, any attempt to cover unthinking
discrimination by adopting a broader standard of knowing in-
tent is likely to be stymied by courts' unwillingness to collapse
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
D. Judicial Recognition of Unconscious Discrimination
While the Supreme Court has come to define discriminato-
ry intent very narrowly as discriminatory purpose, the Court
has occasionally acknowledged the existence of unconscious
discrimination. Fifty years ago, three members of the Court
joined in a dissenting opinion advocating the removal to feder-
al court of certain cases in which federal officers were defen-
dants. The justices explained that these defendants should be
shielded from the hazards of "conscious or unconscious discrim-
ination or hostility."47 A 1950 Supreme Court case extended
the concept of unconscious discrimination to race, when Justice
Jackson argued in dissent that a racially exclusive jury is
unfair in part because jurors are "influenced by impondera-
bles-unconscious and conscious prejudices and preferenc-
es-and a thousand things we cannot detect or isolate in its
verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh." 8
In more recent cases involving the problem of racially
biased jury selection, justices have expressed similar concern
about unconscious racial prejudice on the part of both prosecu-
tors and jurors. In the case establishing that the equal protec-
tion clause precludes prosecutors from using peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude potential jurors because of race, Batson v.
Kentucky,49 Justice Marshall argued in a concurring opinion
that peremptory challenges should be barred entirely. Justice
Marshall explained that conscious racial prejudice was not the
only issue. Instead, because of common racial stereotypes
[a] prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him
easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sullen", or
"distant", a characterization that would not have come to his mind if
a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or un
"Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 145 (1945) (Justices Roberts, Frank-
furter, and Jackson, dissenting).
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1995] 1311
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
conscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well
supported."5
Members of the current court continue to worry about the
impact of unconscious racism. In the 1992 case that extended
the equal protection prohibition on racial challenges to defen-
dants, Georgia v. McCollum, Justice O'Connor argued in dis-
sent that the decision might wind up disadvantaging minority
defendants. She warned that if minority defendants could not
use their peremptory challenges to secure minority representa-
tion on the jury, they would face discrimination because "[iut is
by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect
the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the
facts presented at their trials."5' Most recently, Justice
Ginsburg articulated the pervasive problem of unthinking bias.
In a dissent joined by Justice Souter to the Court's decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, applying strict scrutiny in
all affirmative action cases, Justice Ginsburg pointed to "the
persistence of racial inequality."" She went on to assert that
"[b]ias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional
and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that
must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination
are ever genuinely to become this country's law and prac-
tice."5
3
In the area of Title VII claims, the Supreme Court has
sometimes indicated that the disparate impact theory itself
was meant to create liability for unconscious discrimination.
For instance, a 1988 case held that disparate impact analysis
is applicable not only to standardized employment tests but
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (J. O'Connor dissenting). Other
members of the current Court have acknowledged the possibility of unconscious
prejudice, though they have also expressed doubt about the utility of explaining
racial inequities as a result of it. In their dissent to a decision that upheld an
afrmative action policy used by the FCC, Justices Kennedy and Scalia noted that
a possible explanation for why the majority group "disadvantaged by the prefer-
ence should feel no stigma at all," was that "racial preferences address not the
evil of intentional discrimination but the continuing unconscious use of stereotypes
that disadvantage minority groups." They added, however, that "this is not a prep-
osition that the many citizens, who to their knowledge 'have never discriminated
against anyone on the basis of race,' [ I will find easy to accept" Metre Broad-
casting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (Kennedy, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
r" 115 S. Ct 2097, 2135 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
&Id.
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also to subjective interviewing and promotion criteria used by
employers.'M In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor suggest-
ed that one of the reasons for submitting these individualized
discretionary decisions to disparate impact analysis was to
address "the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudic-
es" that might not be "adequately policed through disparate
treatment analysis."' Elsewhere in the same opinion, howev-
er, Justice O'Connor asserted that both disparate impact and
disparate treatment cases were intended to attach liability for
the same concept of discrimination. She explained that "[tihe
distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dom-
inate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate
legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment
analysis is used."56
Justice O'Connor's suggestion that disparate impact proce-
dure would be appropriate for revealing unconscious discrimi-
nation, coupled with her assertion that the "ultimate legal is-
sue" in both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases is
identical, opens up the possibility that a disparate treatment
case could properly assign liability for unconscious discrimina-
tion if it were proved. Elsewhere, however, one can find direct
statements by the Court that the intent standard employed in
disparate treatment is a subjective one.'
Recent decisions by appellate courts reflect this ambiguity
about whether it is permissible to assign liability for uncon-
scious discrimination in a disparate treatment case. In a hiring
practice case, for example, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant
summary judgement to an employer who claimed that the
plaintiff simply performed poorly in a job interview. The court
said that to grant summary judgement based on this general
explanation of the challenged decision "would immunize from
effective review all sorts of conscious and unconscious discrimi-
nation," indicating that unconscious discrimination could be a
proper basis for disparate treatment liability. In another
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
SId.
Id. at 987.
' See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645.46 (1989)
(Under disparate impact theory, "a facially neutral employment practice may be
deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employe's subjective intent
to discriminate that is required in a 'disparate-treatment' case.").
" Thomas v. California State Dep't of Corrections, No. 91-15870, 1992 WL
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disparate treatment case, however, the Seventh Circuit was
unwilling to go so far. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged
the possibility of liability for unthinking discrimination. Af-
firming a grant of summary judgment despite evidence that
the employer had deviated from its disciplinary rules when it
fired the plaintiff, the appellate court noted that, arguably,
"failure to adhere to the rules opens the way to subjective
determinations likely to reflect unconscious racial bias, but if
so there would be evidence of systematic rather than random
disfavoring of blacks." 9 Thus, at least in theory, unconscious
racial bias could meet the intent standard of a disparate treat-
ment case, even in the Seventh Circuit, provided that the
plaintiff offered some kind of "systematic" evidence of bias. A
Third Circuit panel faced the issue directly when a disparate
treatment plaintiff argued that he was the victim of uncon-
scious prejudice. Ultimately, though, the court put aside "the
question of whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff in a dispa-
rate treatment case may prevail based on evidence of
'unconscious' discrimination." The court merely remarked that,
in the case before it, "reliance on this unconventional theory
substantially diminished the probative value of the evi-
dence .... 60
If conscious discriminatory purpose is a requirement for
disparate treatment liability, individual discrimination claims
cannot address the issue of unconscious prejudice.61 Broaden-
ing the subjective intent standard, however, to include knowl-
edge of discriminatory effect would collapse the distinction be-
tween disparate treatment and disparate impact claims." If
instead, some kind of objective standard of intent were used to
define disparate treatment, the current structure of discrimina-
tion law could be maintained. An objective theory of discrimi-
nation liability would also respond to the increasingly common
197414 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1992).
Bush v. Commonwealth Edison, 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1648 (1994).
o Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane).
" One statistical study of intentional discrimination claims found that perhaps
the most important effect of the stringent intent requirement was to depress the
volume of claims litigated, presumably for lack of evidence sufficient to prove in-
tent. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 33.
' See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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perception that much discriminatory behavior takes place
unconsciously, or at least thoughtlessly.'
II. CONSIDERING A NEGLIGENCE ACTION FOR DISPARATE
TREATMENT
At a recent meeting of the Congressionally mandated
Glass Ceiling Commission," Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich
declared that "subtle but pervasive patterns of discrimination
dominate the public, private and nonprofit sectors of society
because of a 'myopia! on the part of many white male manag-
ers who 'unthinkingly discriminate' without having any idea
they are doing so.' s There is growing acknowledgment of
the kind of discriminatory barriers identified by Labor Secre-
tary Reich," yet the behavior he describes may not be against
the law. If disparate treatment requires subjective intent,
Reich's myopic managers cannot be made liable, because their
thoughtless decisions were not consciously discriminatory. At
the same time, the practices behind the patterns Reich de-
scribes may be too subtle and pervasive to be sufficiently
quantifiable for a disparate impact action, even if an individual
plaintiff had the resources for such an analysis.
If, instead of racism, managers were carelessly allowing
some physical danger to harm employees, their employers
might find themselves defending negligence actions brought by
the injured workers. Employers are required by law to use due
care to protect employees' health and safety, failing to do so
will expose them to negligence liability.' A negligence theory
There have been a number of proposals for objective standards that could
support alternative legal theories of individual discrimination, including a recent
article suggesting a Title VII action based on negligence. Oppenheimer, supra note
2.
"The Commission was created by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights
Act. This kind of discrimination is usually quite apparent to thora who come up
against it as they attempt to rise to higher levels of employment. Since it is actu-
ally invisible only to those who create it from above, shouldn't this discriminatory
barrier rather be called the "glass floor"?
Is Catherine S. MNLanegold, 'Glass Ceiling' Is Pervasive Secretary of Labor Con-
tends.7 N.Y. TIMES Sept. 27, 1994, avaiable in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NYT file.
' See supra notes 3-5.
67 RESTATEFENT (SECOND) ToRm, supra note 43, § 314B. David Oppenheimer
has suggested that Title VII imposes an analogous affrmative duty on employers
to exercise due care not to expose employees to discriminatory treatment.
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would conceive racism as a kind of social danger, analogous to
familiar technological hazards that employers currently have a
duty to control. As the preeminent legal standard for judging
unintentionally harmful behavior, negligence doctrine at first
seems a likely source for a liability standard for unconscious
discrimination. Indeed, negligence liability for the unthinking
use of racial stereotypes appears to make sense in a world of
glass ceilings carelessly erected by managers who then fail to
recognize the barriers they have built."' As it turns out,
though, a negligence analysis is ultimately unsatisfactory as a
legal theory for unconscious racism, primarily because it can-
not respond to the meaningful quality of individual discrimina-
tory acts. Nevertheless, investigating the pros and cons of a
negligence theory helps clarify what sort of standard is needed
for a coherent legal action for unthinking discrimination.
A. Elements of an Action for Negligent Discrimination
Under a theory of negligent discrimination, an employer
would have a duty to keep employees reasonably free of dis-
criminatory treatment, just as she must reasonably protect
them from hazardous equipment or faulty wiring.69 David
Oppenheimer has suggested that, when "an employer fails to
act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or should know,
is occurring, which it expects to occur, or which it should ex-
pect to occur, it should be held negligent.'"0
The elements of a cause of action for negligent discrimina-
tion would presumably follow the classic negligence scheme. A
plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant had a duty to
use reasonable care to avoid discrimination and had breached
that duty, i.e., had failed to conform to the standard of reason-
able care. In addition, to attach liability, a plaintiff would have
Oppenheimer, supra note 2. This theory is attractive because it promises to re-
spond to the behavior Secretary Reich pointed out, conduct other commentators
have described as "unconscious racism." See Lawrence, supra note 2.
KEETON r AL., supra note 9, § 32, at 184. "[Ain individual will not be ex-
cused when the individual denies knowledge of the risk; and to this extent, at
least, there is a minimum standard of knowledge, based upon what is common to
the community." KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 32, at 184.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 2 at 967.
70 Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 969.
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to draw a reasonably close causal connection between the
defendant's discriminatory negligence, i.e., lack of care, and the
discriminatory injury, and show that this negligence had re-
sulted in actual loss or damages. 1 If all of these elements
were present, there would be no need to investigate subjective
intent at all, let alone to prove that the defendant had acted
out of conscious racial animus. A theory of negligent discrim-
ination could thus provide damages to plaintiffs injured by
unthinking racism. It also promises social benefits.
B. The Benefits of a Negligence Standard for Discrimination
A cause of action for negligent discrimination would pro-
vide a legal basis for recovery for injuries widely recognized to
result from racial prejudice, but largely overlooked by current
discrimination law. Equally important, a negligence theory
more accurately expresses the way in which much racial dis-
crimination today really functions, that is, through
decisionmakers' lack of consciousness of the role race plays in
their decisions.:2
The current law paints all race-consciousness as bad, ie.,
potentially discriminatory, and all ignorance and denial of
racial factors in decisions as good, i.e., colorblind, innocent. 3
This dichotomy may actually discourage employers and hous-
ing providers from acknowledging, let alone actively investigat-
ing, the risks of their own unconscious racism. They receive no
credit for doing so and may subject themselves to greater po-
tential liability. In contrast, the emphasis on an affirmative
duty of care in a negligence theory of discrimination should
alleviate some of the legal pressure for potential defendants to
remain ignorant of their own racism.
A negligence theory would tend to treat racism as a wide-
spread problem not limited to a few malevolent individuals.:'
It could thus assign responsibility for discriminatory actions
without demonizing and isolating the person who negligently
1 See KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 130, at 136 (outlining the cause of
action for negligence).
" See supra notes 3-4.
]'Many commentators have criticized this aspect of xdisrimination lawv. See,
e.g., BELL, supra note 2; Aleinikoff supra note 2; Flagg, supra note 2.
" Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 971-72.
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discriminates.75 In theory, anyway, the moral stigma of a
finding of intentional discrimination should not attach to negli-
gent discrimination, because acting negligently is simply not
considered as blameworthy as causing intentional harm. Per-
haps, though, this conclusion overstates the reality-shaping
power of legal forms." The ongoing history of race in our soci-
ety is loaded with moral judgment, shame and outrage. In that
context, changing the modifying adjective from "intentional" to
"negligent" is not likely to drain the word "discrimination" of
its moral stigma. What seems more important is the negligence
view of racial discrimination as a widespread social problem.
Few of us see ourselves as deliberately hateful, but most of
us know that we are sometimes careless. The law of negligence
calls our attention to our potential for causing "accidents" in
various areas of our lives and our responsibility to limit that
potential by being careful." As long as individual discrimina-
tion is defined as deliberate animus, most people can assume
that they have nothing to watch out for. In this way, the intent
standard helps ensure that unconscious discrimination is over-
looked not only in lawsuits, but in everyday life. A negligence
analysis would change the legal picture of racism from a por-
trait of a few malevolent individuals to a view of ordinary
people coping with a pervasive social problem.
In fact, resistance to applying a negligence standard to
racism may reflect a societal unwillingness to acknowledge the
pervasiveness of racism, even unconscious racism, and our col-
lective lack of control over racial judgements. As long as we
define discrimination as necessarily conscious, we can limit our
view of both who is injured and who causes discriminatory in-
Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 971-72.
" It may also understate the role of moral judgment in negligence law. Com.
mentators disagree about this. Compare the utilitarian/economic based view of
Richard Posner in, e.g., The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of
Tort Laws, in FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 59 (Saul Levmore ed., 1994) with the
view (criticized by Posner) of George P. Fletcher that liability should be based on
a principle of reciprocity. George P. Fletcher Fairness and Utility in Tort Law, in
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW supra, at 48.
One goal of the tort system is deterrence of behavior deemed risky and thus
potentially costly. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CoSTS OF AcCIDENTS 26 (1970). But
c.f, Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social
Control, in FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 265, supra note 76 (criticizing the view
that law must be at the center of the regulation of social behavior).
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jury. Although a negligence theory minimizes the moral stigma
for racial stereotyping, it magnifies the sense of racial preju-
dice out of control. Thus, though negligent racism may be more
ordinary, and less vicious, it is in some sense more threatening
than deliberate racial malice, because it cannot be confined to
the bad acts of a few pathological individuals.
To the extent that a negligence action for discrimination
would bring the law more in line with everyday experience, it
might be better able than a narrow theory of intentional rac-
ism to support positive social change. This aspect of the negli-
gence theory is the source of its considerable promise. But a
negligence approach to discrimination also has substantial
problems.
C. Problems with a Negligence Theory of Discrimination
A theory of negligent discrimination presents problems
that focus around two elements of any negligence action: stan-
dard of care and injury." What constitutes a reasonable effort
to prevent racial prejudice beyond which racism is excused
from liability? Even asking this question seems strange, but it
must be answered if liability for racial prejudice is really going
to be based on negligence 9 The answer cannot be "as much
care as it takes," for then the standard is no longer negligence
but strict liability.' Thus, a negligence theory of discrimina-
tion would not only broaden the liability standard, it would
create a category of legal, i.e., non-negligent, discrimination. As
it now stands, the law does not recognize unintentional indi-
vidual discrimination as discrimination at all. Without a stan-
dard of knowing intent, even recognized disparate racial im-
pact does not count as intentional discrimination.
The current sharp legal distinction between discriminatory
treatment and discriminatory effect may reflect resistance to
immunizing harm that is caused by racial bias. It is one thing
to excuse broad policies that happen to have some negative ef-
fects for one racial group. It is quite another proposition to ap-
78 KEEION, ET AL., supra note 9, § 30 at 164.
79 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, supra note 43, § 282 (stating that "negli-
gence is defined as conduct which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.').
I' KEETON, ET AL, supra note 9, § 75 at 536.
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prove as reasonable an individual decision to fire or refuse to
rent a home to a particular individual because of race, whether
or not the decisionimaker realized that his decision was based
on racial prejudice. Creating an explicit category of "reason-
able" discrimination might cause more social conflict than it
corrects.
Apart from its policy ramifications, a standard of care for
positive race consciousness is difficult to define in practical
terms. Very little is known about what sorts of education or
policies could prevent conscious or unconscious racism. Ulti-
mately, the difficulty in defining discriminatory injury and a
standard of care may only be resolved by abandoning a negli-
gence approach and shifting to a different kind of objective
standard.
1. The Problematic Injury of Negligent Discrimination
Absent conscious intent to discriminate or comparative evi-
dence of group disadvantage, what defines discriminatory inju-
ry? That is, if discrimination involves distinguishing between
one person or group and another "because of race," such a
distinction can only appear through a showing of a differential
outcome between races or a showing that racial difference was
some meaningful part of the challenged decision. Otherwise it
is hard to see how discrimination can be said to have caused
injury.
In a typical tort analysis of accidental injury, it is possible
to identify some force or object-electricity, a car, a golf
club-that was the instrument of the injury. In a negligence
analysis, the question is whether or not the alleged tortfeasor
handled the instrumentality with reasonable care.81 When one
asks the person who swung the golf-club that connected with
the girl's head or the electrician who crossed the wires that
caused the fire why he did it, each may say "I did not mean
to," to which one can reply--"it does not matter whether you
meant to or not, you should have known better."2 The task of
a negligence theory of racism is to justify exactly this answer
when a defendant says she did not mean to discriminate.
" See KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 31.
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 43, § 289.
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It is against the law for a person to deliberately crash his
tractor-style lawn mower into his neighbor's shed, smashing
the shed to bits because he dislikes his neighbor. And it is also
against the law to mow carelessly so that the mower goes out
of control and ends up demolishing the shed by accident. In the
latter scenario, the fact that the tortfeasor despised his neigh-
bor might suggest that an "unconscious intent" to injure him
underlay the "accident" with the mower. But in the cause of
action for negligence, such an unconscious intent would be
irrelevant, and no psychological inquiry would be necessary.'
In the cause of action for negligent racism this also would be
true. Negligence instead requires an evaluation of a danger.
the risk of harm if the lawnmower goes out of control; a duty
and standard of care-the mower driver's responsibility to take
reasonable steps to control the mower; a breach of that du-
ty-his failure to exercise reasonable care while mowing, and a
causal connection between that failure and the injury-the fact
that but for his carelessness, the neighbor's shed would still be
intact.' The problem in a theory of negligent racism is to
identify the lawnmower. Of course, if the mower driver were
an intentional tortfeasor, he would have both a harmful mower
and a harmful intent. The problem of discrimination as a tort
is that these two "engines" of injury collapse together. In the
legal theory of disparate treatment, the mower may not exist
without subjective intent.' Because it does not include either
subjective intent or any element of expressive meaning, a theo-
ry of negligent racism has trouble conceiving of a way for the
harm of discrimination to get from the careless discriminator
to the person she discriminates against without the mower of
intent.86
" Except perhaps to ask what the individual kmew that might have alerted
him to the risk of the accident. But, generally, "[n]egligence is conduct and not a
state of mind." KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 31, at 169.
84 KEETON, ET AL, supra note 9, § 31, at 69.
85 In tort law, similar problems arise when plaintiffs attempt to recover for
emotional suffering caused by negligent behavior that did not inflict physical inju-
ry. See WIfAM L. PROSSER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 392-409 (8th
ed. 1988).
" As Professor Gudel has pointed out concepts of 'cau e "motive" and "in-
tent" are frequently difficult to disentangle in courts' discrimination decisions, in
part because these classic tort categories are not particularly uzeful for
interpreting the reason for, or the meaning of, someone's actions. Paul J. Gudel,
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2. Standard of Care
However a negligent injury is defined, it can only occur
through a breach of care.87 In order to have a breach, howev-
er, one must first have a standard of care that a defendant can
either meet or fail to reach." Defining a standard for avoiding
racial discrimination is problematic. The mowing man who
demolishes his neighbor's shed would not be held liable for
negligence (no matter how hateful a person he was), if he could
show that he had exercised reasonable care to avoid the acci-
dent. 9 Under a negligence theory, Title VII and Title VIII
create a duty to exercise reasonable care not to discriminate.
But what is it that individuals would be expected to do in
order to meet that duty?
The theory of negligent discrimination proceeds from an
assumption that increased consciousness of race would de-
crease discrimination. Thus, the aim of a negligence standard
should be to require employers and landlords to ask them-
selves-or, if they are organizations, to ask their
agents-whether thoughtless adherence to racial stereotypes is
affecting their decisions, and, if it is, to stop relying on those
stereotypes. A true negligence standard would thus give indi-
vidual employers and housing providers an affirmative duty to
make inquiries and take steps to control unthinking racism,
but they would only have a duty to do so much.9' Following
Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in




David Oppenheimer first defines liability for negligent discrimination as
triggered by a failure "to act to prevent discrimination which [an employer] knows,
or should know, is occurring, which it expects to occur, or which it should expect
to occur." Oppenheimer, supra note 2 at 969. He goes on to describe an assign.
ment of liability, though, in circumstances that sound more like strict liability:
"Where an employer has created job screening procedures which fail to correct for
unconscious discrimination, and such discrimination influences the process, the
employer ought to be subject to negligence liability." Oppenheimer, supra note 2
at 970. In other words, Oppenheimer gives no indication of a limit to the
employer's investment in preventing discrimination beyond which the employer can
claim that it has acted reasonably. This appears to be a de facto strict liability
standard, not negligence at all.
91 KEETON, Er AL., supra note 9, § 31, at 170; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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the usual negligence standard, they would only be required to
make "reasonable" efforts to control unconscious racism.'
The difficulty of envisioning what steps employers would
need to take to avoid negligence liability for unthinking racism
may point to a basic conflict within a theory of negligent dis-
crimination. On the one hand, there are similarities between
unthinking discrimination and the sort of physical carelessness
that negligence classically addresses. In both cases, a lack of
attention to the likely effects of one's actions may lead to inju-
ry. Likewise, in both cases, if the tortfeasor had realized that
her carelessness was about to cause injury, she would not have
proceeded to act as she did. On the other hand, though, in
some important ways unthinking adherence to racial stereo-
types is not at all like neglecting machine maintenance or
forgetting to replace the burned-out light over the stairs. If the
person who has carelessly failed to keep control of the physical
environment is confronted with evidence that her carelessness
led to harm, she is likely to recognize, at least, that some sort
of injury took place. She may even acknowledge that her ac-
tion-or inaction-was a cause of the injuries, while still in-
sisting that she was reasonable in acting as she did. In con-
trast, the person whose unthinking use of racial stereotypes is
exposed may not even agree that any sort of discriminatory
injury took place, let alone that his action caused the damage
because it was unconsciously racist. Even were the law to
explicitly recognize careless racism, individual defendants'
unexamined racial stereotypes are likely to remain far less
accessible to their own understanding and correction than
their inattention to physical safety."
Setting a standard of care for negligent racism suffers
from another problem as well. There is a surprising lack of
available information about how to reduce any sort of racism;
surprising, that is, considering how much damage racism does
in American society. There are professional consultants whose
TORTS, supra note 43, § 291 cmt. b. ("Conduct is not negligent unless the magni-
tude of the risk involved therein so outweighs its utility as to make the risk un-
reasonable).
12 KEETON, ET AL, supra note 9, § 31 at 170.
"Julie Kowitz pointed this out to me. Of course, the law's emphasis on delib-
erate racial animus as the sine qua non of individual discrimination is part of the
reason unthinling racial discrimination is so hard for individuals to recognize.
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business it is to advise corporations on creating "diversity
awareness" in the workplace.94 But there is little published
information on the effectiveness of any given technique these
people employ. Without this sort of information, judges or
juries would have difficulty deciding whether a given company
was doing what it should to prevent racist decisionmaking.
How could the costs and benefits of any existing program be
assessed? Finally, trying to define a level of care beyond which
employers or housing providers would not be held liable for
some instances of unthinking racism meets with bedrock re-
sistance to immunizing any identifiable discriminatory behav-
ior as "reasonable."
3. Lessons from the Negligence Analysis
The main problems with a negligence theory of discrimina-
tion are the difficulty of defining the source of a discriminatory
injury without reference to some meaningful or expressive
aspect of the challenged action and a reluctance to excuse any
identified discriminatory act as reasonable. The fact that these
problems spring from basic defining concepts of negligence
theory suggests that a negligence approach may not be the
best way to assign liability for unthinking racism. Ultimately,
the poor fit of a negligence analysis to discrimination probably
traces back to the problematic equation of reasons for decisions
with causes of the physical events that are at the core of neg-
ligence law.95
Examining a negligence theory, however, sheds light on
two requirements for an objective standard that could respond
effectively to the problem of thoughtless discrimination. Like a
negligence standard, an objective standard for unthinking
racism must assign liability without reference to subjective in-
tent. Unlike negligence, though, the objective standard must be
capable of taking into account the meaningful aspect of the
challenged action that identifies it as discriminatory. In addi-
"" A recent newspaper story describes one such program run by consultants in
the U.S. Department of Transportation that was suspended after 11 years of oper-
ation due to worker complaints that it was abusive. U.S. Offered Unusual Class
on 'Diversity,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995 at A34.
" Some commentators complain that existing discrimination law suffers from
this problem. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 86.
[Vol. 61: 12991324
A REMEDY FOR UNTHINKG DISCRIDMNATiON
tion, in order to reflect the law's formal commitment to a non-
discriminatory society, the objective standard must assign
liability in a principled way for all identified instances of dis-
crimination. The following sections look to existing discrimi-
nation law for concepts and structures from which to fashion a
workable standard of liability for unthinking discrimination.
II. A MODEL FOR AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD EXISTS IN
CURRENT DISCRIIIINATION LAW
An objective standard of discriminatory meaning could
define individual conduct as discriminatory, without relying on
subjective intent. Since the trigger for liability would be the
discriminatory message conveyed by the challenged action,
liability would attach to all identified instances of this kind of
discrimination. The use of an objective standard of discrimina-
tory meaning is not a novel idea." In fact, in at least one area
of discrimination law, suits for discriminatory housing adver-
tising under Title VII, several federal circuit courts apply this
kind of standard." A similar concept could be applied in dis-
parate treatment cases.
A. An Objective Standard of Discriminatory Meaning: Ragin v.
New York Times
Besides outlawing discrimination in housing sales or rent-
als, the Fair Housing Act (FHA) also makes it illegal "[tlo
make, print, or publish.., any notice, statement, or advertise-
' In his landmark article, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, Charles Lawrence suggests that a social meaning test be
used to decide racial challenges on the basis of equal protection. Lawrence was the
first to define clearly and in detail the problem that a subjective intent standard
excludes much of the conduct through which racism today operates. His focus on a
psychological theory of the subjective unconscious as the source of this unmindful
racism, however, especially his emphasis on Freud, tends to thrust the definition
of racial discrimination even deeper into the mind of the individual defendant.
That is why the standard of liability he ultimately proposes, the objective social
meaning test, seems strangely disconnected from the theory of unconscious subjec-
tivity articulated in the first part of his article. Nevertheless, h does propose
such a test and describe its function in some detail See Lawrence, cupra note 2.
The notion of assessing the meaningful component of discrimination as a sort of
intent is clearly indebted to his analysis.
"See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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ment, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indi-
cates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race ... ."" Every circuit that has heard a claim under this
section has held that no subjective discriminatory intent is re-
quired to assign liability for a discriminatory statement or
advertisement.99 Instead, courts apply an objective standard
first adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 1972 when it held that
an advertisement for an apartment in a "white home" was dis-
criminatory, because it would be understood as racially exclu-
sive by an "ordinary reader."00 Since then, the Second, Sixth,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have all adopted versions of the
"ordinary reader" standard.1 '
A 1991 case in the Second Circuit, Ragin v. New York
Times Co., 2 further articulated the objective "ordinary read-
er" standard. In Ragin, African-American readers sued the
New York Times for running real estate advertisements featur-
ing photos that either excluded black models altogether or
dressed them as maids and doormen while whites were posed
as prospective home buyers.'03 According to the court in
Ragin, in a claim of discriminatory advertising the defendant
is liable "when an ordinary reader would understand the ad as
suggesting a racial preference."' This ordinary reader is
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988).
Jancik v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th
Cir. 1995) (applying an objective standard and surveying the holdings of other
circuits on this issue).
100 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972) ("To the ordinary reader the natural interpretation of the adver-
tisements published ... is that they indicate a racial preference . . .).
" Jancik, 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995); Ragin v. New York Times, 923 F.2d 995
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991); Housing Opportunities v. Cincin-
nati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991); Spann v. Colonial Village, 899
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990).
102 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
103 Id. at 998.
"' Id. at 1002. It is possible to see the theory underlying Ragin as merely
another branch of disparate effect liability, and thus miss the importance of dis.
carding the test for subjective intent in this case. But the Ragin court did not
base its move away from subjective intent on the kind of evidence that makes up
a prima facie case of disparate impact. There was no proof in Ragin that the
challenged ads were actually discouraging people of one race from renting or buy-
ing the pictured properties and thus either disadvantaging one racial group or per-
petuating segregation. It is the meaning of the message itself that creates liability,
not its effect.
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simply another incarnation of the common law reasonable
person, "that familiar creature by whose standards human
conduct has been judged for centuries."10S
The court in Ragin stated explicitly that advertisements
judged racist by the "ordinary reader" standard were illegal,
"whether or not the creator of the ad had a subjective racial
intent." °" The focus is on the meaning of the ad itself, and
the FHA outlaws "all ads that indicate a racial preference to
an ordinary reader whatever the advertiser's intent." " The
court further explained that should an ad's creator deny all
knowledge that an ad's content is discriminatory a factfinder
may disbelieve the advertiser and draw an inference of dis-
criminatory intent "much as" factfinders do in an ordinary
disparate treatment case, or "may consider such an assertion
an inadvertent or unconscious expression of racism."103
B. Adapting the Ragin Standard to Ordinary Disparate
Treatment Cases
Title VIII liability attaches for a racist housing advertise-
ment that expresses unconscious racial prejudice. Why, then,
shouldn't the expression of unconscious prejudice through
racist rejections of prospective tenants also create liability? It
is not obvious why conscious racist intent should be needed to
make an illegal discriminatory decision to turn away prospec-
tive tenants but not to express an illegal discriminatory deci-
sion about how to attract prospective tenants. Then again,
advertising images differ from live interactions in fundamental
ways."°e At first, these differences might seem to justify the
' Id. at 1002.
10 Id. at 1000.
"0 Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000 (emphasis added).
I d. at 1001 (emphasis added).
"' The Second Circuit has subsequently extended the "ordinary reader" stan-
dard to "an ordinary listener" when the § 3604(c) claim involves statements made
in the course of a housing transaction. Soules v. United States Dep't of Housing
and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992). In Soules, though, the court
opined that "[flacially nondiscriminatory statements pose even greater difficulties
than facially nondiscriminatory ads. The written content of questions and state-
ments does not demonstrate the inflection of the speaker, and out of necessity
courts must turn to other evidence in determining whether a violation of the FHA
occurred." Id. at 825. The court in Soules ultimately found that asling a housing




Advertising images are designed, first and foremost, to be
persuasive messages, so choices involved in selecting models
for an advertisement are by definition expressive of meaning.
In contrast, while a landlord's selection of tenants may express
many things, it is not primarily an expressive action. Arguably,
a different level of individual control also operates in the two
contexts. Advertisers not only select models, they directly ma-
nipulate the models' appearance to express the message they
wish to present. Landlords' choices, though, are limited by who
comes looking for housing, and they generally must take their
prospective tenants as they find them. The Ragin court hinted
at this distinction when it explained that "[a]dvertising is a
make-up-your-own world in which one builds an image from
scratch.... ."" In the real world, a defendant does not have
as much control over the situation being judged."'
It might be thought unfair to base liability on a reasonable
person's interpretation of the defendant's action when the
defendant does not control the expressive content of her action
to the extent an advertiser does. The law often assigns liabil-
ity, however, based on what a hypothetical reasonable person
would have done under complex, dynamic circumstances, many
of which are outside the control of the real person whose ac-
tions are later judged. What sets disparate treatment cases
apart, then, is not that they require an interpretation of com-
plex circumstances that include elements outside the
defendant's control. The unique difficulty in applying an objec-
tive standard to discrimination cases is that they entail a judg-
ment about an action's expressive meaning, rather than an
action's tendency to expose the plaintiff to physical, emotional
or economic harm. What Ragin shows is that this specific kind
of expressive meaning, that is, racial preference or discrimina-
cate discrimination on the basis of family status. In evaluating the challenged
statements, the court fell back on an inquiry into the speaker's intent. The court
insisted though, that intent was relevant "not because a lack of design constitutes
an affirmative defense to an FHA violation, but because it helps determine the
manner in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary listener would
have interpreted it." Id.
110 Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1001.
. But the meaning of advertisements, also, is at least partially dependent on
factors outside the designers' control, including the experiences and perspectives of
the readers who interpret them and the context in which they appear.
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tion, can be evaluated objectively, without referring to subjec-
tive intent.
Basically, the Ragin standard says that, in an advertising
case, if it looks like discrimination, it is discrimination. In
ordinary disparate treatment cases, however, courts seem to
want to ask if things really are as they appear. The notion that
in real life, as opposed to pictures, there is a truth separate
from and somehow behind appearance is itself open to ques-
tion. The important question here, though, is whether the legal
determination of true discrimination in real life necessarily
depends on the defendant's subjective, conscious intent. The
Ragin court held that there is no necessary equivalence be-
tween the meaning of a choice and the conscious thoughts of
the chooser. Rather, those thoughts, even if they were perfectly
transparent, would not exhaust the meaning of the choice for
an ordinary reader.
It was the necessary element of meaning common to all
individual discriminatory conduct that created problems for a
negligence analysis; it is this same meaningful aspect of a
challenged action that can be analyzed as a kind of expressive
message. The Ragin case shows that existing discrimination
law doctrine can accommodate an objective standard of dis-
criminatory meaning. If a person can express an unconscious
discriminatory attitude by excluding blacks from an ad that
reasonable readers then would see as racially biased, surely
she can express that same sort of unconscious prejudice in a
choice to exclude a black tenant from a building."
C. The Benefits of the Ragin Standard
The Ragin standard responds to the problem of defining
discriminatory injury without subjective intent. Unlike a negli-
gence standard, however, the objective standard in Ragin fo-
cuses attention on the defining component of racial meaning
I The fact that an advertising image is fixed, of coure, means that at one
level what the image "says" will be easier to prove than what a defendant meant
by a disputed action. In the latter case, e.g., there may be factual disputes about
the words or tone of voice a defendant used. But the ultimate issue of whether
the defendant's actions should be interpreted as discriminatory, based on the avail-




that is also provided by a subjective intent requirement. In the
context of discriminatory treatment cases, a standard adapted
from Ragin could be characterized as an objective standard of
inferred intent."' Like a negligence standard of care, an in-
ferred intent standard for discrimination focusses on societal
expectations, rather than on individual malice. The expecta-
tion, however, is not only that some "reasonable" effort will be
made to prevent unthinking racism from causing harm. Rath-
er, inferred intent would assign legal responsibility for every
identified instance of unthinking discrimination. Moreover, the
inferred intent standard's emphasis on an objective social ex-
pectation preserves a concept of racism as a widespread ten-
dency. The question is, could such a standard fit within a dis-
parate treatment action as currently conceived? As it turns
out, the procedural structure used in disparate treatment ac-
tions not only could accommodate such a standard, it may al-
ready assign liability on the basis of an implicit inferred intent
standard in certain cases.
IV. ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL
STEREOTYPES IN DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
The indirect proof structure used in disparate treatment
cases is often explained as a way to unmask defendants' hid-
den racial bias. What is less frequently discussed is the possi-
bility that the prejudice revealed through this process may
have been hidden from the defendant herself. Under the three-
step procedural structure of a disparate treatment claim, once
a plaintiff proves a prima facie case-that is, proves that he is
a member of a protected class and is qualified for an available
job or housing opportunity for which he was rejected-the
evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to produce an alter-
native, legitimate reason for the plaintiff's rejection."' The
plaintiff then has a chance to prove that the defendant's expla-
s The term "inferred intent" is sometimes used in other areas of the law,
including cases involving threats on the president's life, fireworks, and child abuse.
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1256 (1987) (stating that "the
Ninth Circuit has adopted an objective intent standard for interpreting the re-
quirement that a threat be made 'knowingly and willfully.').
"' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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nation is false. " 5 The plaintiffs attack on the defendant's ex-
planation is often referred to as an attempt to prove "pre-
text."" 6 In practice, though, discrediting the proffered reason
for the action does not necessarily reveal conscious discrimina-
tion.
The term "pretext" connotes deliberate deception on the
part of the defendant, which in turn suggests concealment of a
conscious discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court initially
described this step as an employee's "opportunity to demon-
strate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid
reasons for his rejection were a cover-up for a racially discrimi-
natory decision."" Disproving the defendant's proffered ex-
planation, however, does not necessarily prove that the defen-
dant was deliberately concealing conscious racial distinctions.
The defendant's explanation will also be false if it was used to
rationalize an unthinking application of a racial stereotype. It
is quite possible that the "pretext" with which the defendant
"covered up" race prejudice obscured her own perception of
prejudice as well. Thus, if disparate treatment plaintiffs can
prove discrimination simply by disproving defendants' explana-
tions for the challenged actions, discrimination based on the
unconscious use of racial stereotypes can trigger liability un-
less factfinders were explicitly admonished to immunize this
type of discrimination. The fact that an additional, explicit
limitation would be necessary to prevent assigning liability
shows that a narrow, subjective definition of intent is not inte-
gral to disparate treatment law as it is practiced today. The
burden-shifting structure, even as limited by the Court's recent
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"' logically ac-
commodates the inferred intent approach that can be used to
encompass the unconscious application of racial stereotypes.
The burden shift in disparate treatment cases parallels a
classic tort doctrine, res ipsa loquitur. In a res ipsa case, a
plaintiff makes use of a presumption of negligence if no direct
us Id.
"s See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US. 248, 253
(1981) (plaintiff must have a chance to prove "that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimina-
tion.").
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
' 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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evidence of negligence is available. Res ipsa is needed when
there is no direct evidence of what caused the harm, for exam-
ple, when a plane mysteriously falls from the sky and much of
the wreckage is lost at sea."9 A res ipsa inference is only jus-
tified, however, if planes rarely fall from the sky unless some-
one was negligent.12 It must be true that under the circum-
stances, more probably than not the accident was caused by
some kind of negligence, though exactly what happened may
never be known.121
Like a res ipsa inference, the burden shift in a disparate
treatment case can be seen as a different way to prove an old
standard of liability-in the res ipsa case, negligence, in the
disparate treatment case, subjective intent. The burden shift
may also be seen, though, as a way to shift the standard of
what is to be proved. Because it allows liability to attach for
the lack of an explanation, reasons other than the conventional
liability standard may actually be behind the action. Thus, the
doctrine of res ipsa in tort cases involving consumers injured
by mass-manufactured products functioned as a bridge from
traditional negligence liability to strict liability for manufactur-
ing defects."2 Eventually the allowance of indirect proof for
res ipsa cases was recognized as a new doctrine of liability for
injury due to defect."2 I am advocating an analogous move in
the area of individual discrimination law. The fact that the
burden shift in disparate treatment cases can allow liability to
attach without proving subjective intent should be openly ac-
knowledged as a doctrine of liability for unconscious discrimi-
nation.
... Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1044 (1968).
120 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9 § 39, at 244-70.
121 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 9 § 39, at 248.
122 See JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKi, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 11-17
(2d ed. 1992).
' Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 463 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been
dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the
rule of strict liability.").
[Vol. 61:1299
A REMEDY FOR UNTHINTG DISCRI MNATION
A. Tightening the Effect of the Burden Shift: St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks
The 1993 Supreme Court decision in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks held that proving that a defendant's explana-
tion is false does not necessarily mandate a judgement for
plaintiff.' Most commentators have focused on the way in
which Hicks restricted liability by overturning a majority rule
among the federal circuit courts that found discrimination as a
matter of law whenever a plaintiff disproved the defendant's
counter explanation.' It is equally important, however, to
notice what the holding of Hicks leaves intact. In fact, Hicks
reaffirmed that a finding of intentional discrimination may be
based on the rejection of a defendant's explanation for the
challenged action, with no additional evidence of discrimina-
tion. 6 Moreover, Hicks created a more equitable basis for an
explicit shift to an objective inferred intent standard. The ma-
jority in Hicks clarified that the procedural structure in dispa-
rate treatment shifts only the burden of production to the
defendant, not the burden of proof.' Thus, the Hicks deci-
sion ensures that whatever standard of discriminatory intent is
applied, plaintiffs will have to rigorously prove that standard
in order to attach liability.
Finally, an examination of the Court's reasoning in Hicks
shows that an inferred intent standard is not only needed to
assign liability for unthinking discrimination, but also to pre-
serve the integrity of all disparate treatment actions as they
now proceed. Without the express adoption of an inferred in-
tent standard that includes the unthinking use of stereotypes,
the initial presumption of disparate treatment that triggers the
burden shift may not be justified. That presumption is based
u2 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
"' See, eg., Kenneth IL Davis, The Stumbling Three.Step, Burdcn-Shifling Ap-
proach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995); Mat-
thew D. OLeary, St. Mary's v. Hicks: The Supreme Court Restricts the Indirect
Method of Proof in Title Vii Claims, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 821 (1994).
' Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. In his dissent, however, Justice Soutar expresses
concern that the majority opinion may be read to mean that disproving the expla-
nation alone is never sufcient to prove discrimination. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J,
dissenting).
n' Id. at 2747.
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on the likelihood that, once plaintiff proves a prima facie case,
discrimination explains the challenged action. Unless unthink-
ing prejudice counts as discrimination, this may not be so.
Thus, adopting an inferred intent standard is critical to pre-
serving disparate treatment plaintiffs' opportunity to prove
discrimination--conscious and unconscious-through the bur-
den-shifting proof process.
1. The Facts and Lower Court Decisions in Hicks
Melvin Hicks, an African-American man, worked at St.
Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house managed by the Mis-
souri Department of Corrections and Human Resources." In
1983, a state investigation found that St. Mary's was poorly
run, and in January 1984, Hicks's supervisors were re-
placed.129 Up until that time, Hicks, who had held a manage-
ment position as a shift commander, had a satisfactory employ-
ment record with no disciplinary actions. In the following six
months, however, he was repeatedly disciplined for various
infractions, demoted, and finally fired.' °
Hicks filed a disparate treatment suit and made out his
prima facie case by showing that he was black and qualified
for the position he had lost, and that the position had re-
mained open and finally been filled by a white man.'31 St.
Mary's explained that Hicks had been fired not because of race
but on account of his accumulation of a number of serious
violations of institutional rules. 3 ' In response, however,
Hicks was able to show that similar and even more serious
violations by coworkers had been disregarded or treated more
leniently and that he had been disciplined as a supervisor for
his subordinates' infractions while other supervisors had
not.
133
The district court found that Hicks had proven that St.
Mary's proffered explanations of their actions were false."
128 Id. at 2746.
129 Id.
130 Id.
"2 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249-1250 (E.D. Mo.
1991).
132 Id. at 1250.
1 Id.
12 Id. The court pointed out that Hicks "was mysteriously the only person
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The court went on to say, however, that even though Hicks
had "proved pretext" and "the existence of a crusade to termi-
nate him," he had not proved "that the crusade was racially
rather than personally motivated."' Ultimately the district
court said that Hicks had failed to prove "that his unfair treat-
ment was motivated by his race" and entered judgment for St.
Mary's.13
6
The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that, as the district
court itself found, St. Mary's "simply never stated that person-
al motivation was a reason for their actions or offered evidence
to substantiate such a claim."' Instead, St. Mary's had "ar-
ticulated only two legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
their actions (the severity and accumulation of Hicks's disci-
plinary violations), and both were discredited by Hicks as
pretextual. "lra The circuit court concluded that disparate
treatment plaintiffs "may succeed by proving pretext. The
district court found that [Hicks] had done so. [He was] there-
fore entitled to recover."39
2. The Supreme Court Decision in Hicks
In a five-four decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Hicks was
not entitled to a judgment of discrimination just because he
had disproved St. Mary's explanation for his firing.4' Justice
Scalia maintained that finding discrimination as a matter of
disciplined for violations actually committed by his subordinates," and that despite
St. Mary's claim that he was disciplined because he was the shift commander in
charge when the violations occurred, "such a policy only applied to violations
which occurred on plaintiffs shift." Id. In short, Hlcs' violations were neither se-
vere enough nor numerous enough to warrant his dismissal.
" Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
13 Id. at 1252.
Hicks v. St. Mlary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
""Id. The circuit court held that under the burden-shifting structure, since all
of the defendant's proffered reasons were discredited, the defendant was in a poi-
tion of having offered no legitimate reason for its actions. Becaue Hicks had
"proven by a preponderance of the evidence that all the defendant's proffered non-
discriminatory reasons are not true reasons" he had satisfied his ultimate burden
of proof. The appellate court found that the district court's demand that Hicks
"additionally prove by direct evidence or inference that the treatment was motivat-
ed by race" was "contrary to the law." Id. at 493.
39 Id,
-, Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2742.
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law merely because Hicks had discredited St. Mary's proffered
explanation would shift, the burden of persuasion improperly
to the defendants.14 ' Previous cases had made clear that
though disparate treatment defendants must produce an expla-
nation to rebut the initial inference of discrimination, plaintiffs
bear the burden of persuasion throughout the case."'
In dissent, Justice Souter raised the possibility that Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion in Hicks might be read to hold that proof
of pretext can never be sufficient to support a judgment for a
disparate treatment plaintiff without some additional direct
proof of discrimination.14 1 In his majority opinion, however,
Justice Scalia insisted that "rejection of the defendant's prof-
fered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination," and that discrediting the
defendant's explanation "is enough at law to sustain a finding
of discrimination." 4 Thus, the majority in Hicks explicitly
held that after a defendant's explanation for a challenged ac-
tion has been discredited the jury may find discrimination with
no additional evidence. Hicks said only that a plaintiff who
discredits a defendant's explanation is not necessarily entitled
to a judgment of discrimination as a matter of law.4
The Hicks decision is generally seen as narrowing the
basis for finding defendants liable for disparate treatment.
Nevertheless, by explicitly affirming that factfinders have the
option to find discrimination based on nothing more than a
prima facie case and a discredited employer explanation, the
Court left open the possibility of liability based on unconscious
racial stereotypes. It is important to see that the district
court's apparently narrow subjective standard of racist intent
.. Id. at 2749-50.
.. Quoting from the Court's decision in Burdine, Justice Scalia said that "to
rebut the presumption [of discrimination] 'the defendant need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.' The presumption
having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some re-
sponse, simply drops out of the picture." Id. at 2749.
"3 Id. at 2761 (Souter, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2749 & n.4.
145 Justice Scalia's opinion could alternatively be read to reinterpret the notion
of "pretext" itself as a two-pronged test that requires both proof that the
employer's explanation is false and proof that the plaintiffs assertion of discrimi.
nation is correct. Of course this procedure would just reinscribe the need for direct
proof of discrimination back into a disparate treatment case under the heading of
pretext.
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is not necessarily required by the Supreme Court's decision in
Hicks. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion never directly addressed
the issue of the intent standard and the effect of the burden
shift upon it.
As the finder of fact, the district judge expressed doubts
that disproving St. Mary's explanation meant that race dis-
crimination was necessarily the most likely cause of Hicks's
firing. The court mentioned that black subordinates of Hicks
were not disciplined for their part in the episodes that led up
to Hicks's firing and the fact that blacks sat on the disciplinary
committee that voted to fire him.'46 In the district judge's
view, these facts weighed against a finding that Hicks had
been fired because of his race."7 Instead, the court suggested
that "personal" reasons were a more likely explanation than
racial prejudice." As Justice Souter pointed out, however,
not only did St. Mary's fail to introduce specific evidence of
personal animus toward Hicks, the supervisor whom the dis-
trict judge suggested was responsible for a "crusade to termi-
nate" Hicks denied that there were any "personal difficulties"
between them."' It seems quite possible that other
factfinders might have viewed the "personal" friction between
Hicks and his superiors as at least partly based on race,
though perhaps not at the level of conscious animus. They
might then have found that Hicks had proved discrimination.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks would pre-
clude this outcome.
The district judge, however, apparently saw the question
to be decided as whether Hicks had been the victim of deliber-
ate racial animus or instead had been forced out of his job
because of personal conflicts that had nothing to do with
race. 50 Lacking a legal concept of unthinking discrimination,
and forced to choose between calling the defendants' behavior
illegal overt racism or legal personal hostility, the court chose
the latter. With growing recognition of the prevalence of dis-
L Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252.
117 Id,
U' Hicks, 113 S. Ct at 2766.
" Hicks, 756 F.Supp at 1252 (stating that "although plaintiff has proven the
existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was
racially rather than personally motivated").
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crimination based on unconscious racial stereotypes, however,
the district court's dichotomy appears unrealistic. The rigid
distinction between conscious racial hostility and completely
colorblind personal dislike misconstrues the racial barriers to
employment that Title VII is meant to dismantle. What is
more, this "black-and-white" vision of discrimination does not
match the picture of discrimination liability that is actually
created through current disparate treatment procedure.
B. The Reason for the Burden Shift
It is generally agreed that the burden shifting proof struc-
ture used in disparate treatment cases is necessary because
discrimination is uniquely hard to prove, but why discrimina-
tion should be so "elusive" is not entirely clear.151 The burden
shift has sometimes been explained as a way to allow plaintiffs
to prove subjective intent indirectly. As Justice Rehnquist sar-
donically remarked, "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimo-
ny as to the employer's mental processes."152 In this view, re-
quiring defendants to produce legitimate reasons for their
actions simply circumvents the evidentiary problem posed by
the invisibility of subjective intent. Some discussions of the
burden-shifting proof structure, however, downplay the role of
subjective intent and focus instead on the discriminatory
meaning of a challenged action as it appears. The Court has
explained the burden-shifting structure as a process of elimina-
tion:
[We know from our experience that more often than not people do
not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying rea-
sons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for [the adverse employment action] have been eliminated
as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than
not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some rea-
son, based [its] decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race.15'
'' See Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981) ("the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case
is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question
of intentional discrimination.").
" United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983).
163 Furnco Construction v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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Note that in this description, the discriminatory "reason" that
appears is never characterized as involving subjective intent.
The notion that the burden shift is necessary because
subjective discriminatory intent is often disguised seems ques-
tionable. It is hard to see why conscious intent to discriminate
is more likely to be hidden and difficult to discern than any
other sort of blameworthy, legally punishable intent. Murder-
ers, for example, do not typically announce their intentions,
because, like conscious racists, they recognize that such decla-
rations would bring punishment. What sets discrimination
apart is not that it is frequently kept secret. There must be
some other reason, then, why discrimination plaintiffs are
allowed prove their case by disproving defendants' explana-
tions. I propose that discrimination's character as a meaning-
ful, but sometimes subjectively unintended, expression of prej-
udice is such a distinguishing feature.
The burden shift reflects judicial acknowledgement of the
elusive nature of discrimination. That elusiveness flows from
the very fact that discrimination is not always subjectively
purposeful. If it is difficult to bring evidence of conscious intent
that an actor wishes to hide, it is much harder to prove direct-
ly a motivation that was hidden from the actor herself. The use
of the burden shift to uncover the reasons for a decision can
best be explained by the fact that a decision's discriminatory
basis may not have been clear to the decisionmaker.
C. The Procedural Imposition of Disparate Treatment Liability
for Unthinking Discrimination
Not only is the original need for disparate treatmenes
proof structure best explained by discrimination's sometimes
unconscious nature, the justification for retaining the burden
shift may depend on recognizing the unconscious application of
racial stereotypes as discrimination. The disparate treatment
prima facie case "is simply proof of action taken by the employ-
er from which we infer discriminatory animus because experi-
ence has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it
is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on
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impermissible considerations."" When a qualified person is
rejected for an available job or denied an apartment that is
later given to a person of another race, however, it may not be
true that the decision was most likely based on conscious racial
animus. It may be just as likely that the action was the result
of applying unconscious stereotypes. Thus, the failure to ac-
knowledge unconscious discrimination as a basis for disparate
treatment undermines the burden-shifting structure that cur-
rently facilitates proof of all kinds of discriminatory treatment.
As long as acting on unconscious stereotypes does not
count as discrimination, this behavior must weigh against
conscious discrimination in the balance of probable explana-
tions for the challenged actions.15 Of course no one would
claim that the unconscious application of racial stereotypes is a
"legitimate" explanation for an employment or housing deci-
sion. But if that explanation can neither be ruled out by the
prima facie case nor ruled in under a subjective standard of
intentional discrimination, then it disrupts the analysis and
discredits its claim to accurately reflect experience. Alterna-
tively, as long as the law fails to recognize this kind of behav-
ior as discrimination such conduct can be freely characterized
in other ways that appear legitimate, or at least legal. For in-
stance, such behavior may be seen as motivated by colorblind
personal dislike. This view that vague personal reasons may
explain rejections of minority job or housing applicants then
casts further doubt on the validity of the original presumption
that, more likely than not, purposeful discrimination was in-
volved.
D. The Inferred Intent Standard Implicit in the Burden Shift
Should Be Made Explicit in Substantive Discrimination
Law
Looking more closely at how the shifted proof structure
works reveals that it leads to an implicit inferred intent stan-
dard that encompasses unconscious as well as conscious dis-
" urnco, 438 U.S. at 579-80.
"6 Without discussion, the majority in Hicks suggested that the current dispa-
rate treatment prima facie case was generally unpersuasive, referring to its "mini-
mal requirements." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
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crimination. There are three ways for a disparate treatment
plaintiff to discredit a defendant's proffered explanation for a
challenged action.' The plaintiff can show that defendant's
explanation is wrong factually, i.e., plaintiff never did what
defendant now says she did; show that others who exhibited
the behavior defendant now claims explained the action were
treated more leniently than plaintiff; or provide additional
evidence that makes the defendant's reliance on the proffered
explanation incredible, e.g., that plaintiff received consistently
glowing evaluations that clearly outweigh the relatively minor
infraction the defendant now offers as the reason for the
plaintiff's dismissal.' 7 None of these three methods of dis-
crediting a defendant's explanation necessarily entails proof
that the defendant was lying when he proffered the explana-
tion. Instead, in each case, proving that the explanation is
false could also mean that the defendant himself believed the
proffered reason but was actually motivated in part by uncon-
scious racial prejudice.
In the first type of situation, a defendant might, for exam-
ple, assert that plaintiff was fired on account of numerous
incidents of tardiness and insubordination. Upon investigation,
though, it may turn out that plaintiff was usually on time and
that the few incidents of conflict between the plaintiff and her
superiors could be ascribed not to insubordination but to the
plaintiff's good faith attempt to offer her opinion of how a par-
ticular problem should be solved. The employer may have de-
liberately fabricated the false description to cover up a con-
sciously racist decision. Alternatively, though, the employer
may have misperceived the incidents as numerous and insub-
ordinate because he subscribes to stereotypes that characterize
the plaintiff's racial group as unreliable and aggressive.
In the second type of case, it is even easier to see that an
employer may simply fail to recognize that her actions are
motivated by unconscious racial stereotypes. The employer
may, for instance, treat identical rules infractions more harsh-
ly in black employees than in whites. Again, such disparate
treatment might well be the result of unconsciously deployed
"Z Davis, supra note 125 at 731-32 (citing Mhonzer v. Diamond Shamrock Che.




racial stereotypes. Even after the fact, the employer may not
recognize that her actions were based on prejudice. It would
still be accurate, however, to say that her real reason for act-
ing was discriminatory.
Finally, in the third kind of situation in which additional
contradictory evidence surfaces, employers may not realize that
they were disposed to ignore some employees' positive attrib-
utes because of racial stereotypes. Thus, a black employee's
fine work evaluations may be erased by relatively minor criti-
cisms that would hardly be noticed in a white worker's record.
Again the employer's proffered reason for her actions could be
discredited without proving either a deliberate coverup or
conscious racial prejudice.
In each of these cases, the actual effect of the burden shift
challenges the abstract notion that conscious discrimination is
the only appropriate basis for liability in disparate treatment
actions. Why should the defendant's liability in any of these
examples hinge on whether or not she was aware of her preju-
diced motivations at the time she acted? In all of these exam-
ples proving whether or not a defendant was conscious of the
discriminatory reason for her challenged action becomes a
separate and extraneous issue. The central question is whether
or not the action actually reflects some kind of racial prejudice.
The courts should explicitly adopt an objective standard of
inferred intent for disparate treatment that embraces the pro-
cedural effect of the burden shift. Factf'mders should be told
that the logical effect of the indirect method of proof is a legal-
ly valid one: if they find that defendant's proffered reason was
false and that the real reason for the challenged action was
either deliberately racist or unconsciously influenced by nega-
tive racial stereotypes, they may find for the plaintiff. If, how-
ever, they believe that though defendant's explanation of the
action was false, race really played no part in the decision,
they must find for the defendant."' 8
15' This is the holding of Hicks. Justice Scalia offers as an example a situation
in which a plaintiff is turned down for a job at a firm that hires a
disproportionately high number of employees from plaintiffs minority group and
the manager who rejected plaintiff was a member of that minority-and is now
unavailable to testify. In such a case, if the employer's proffered explanation for
the rejection was proven false, but there was no further evidence of discrimination
it might indeed be reasonable for a jury to find that plaintiff had not proven his
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The need for an explicit standard of inferred intent is all
the more urgent, because without that concept, the existing
burden-shifting structure seems unjustified. In fact, it may not
be possible to defend the indirect proof structure used in dispa-
rate treatment cases while insisting that only subjectively pur-
poseful racial discrimination is illegal. Both the initial infer-
ence of discrimination that flows from the prima facie case and
the final permissive inference of discrimination based on dis-
proving the defendant's proffered explanation depend on the
likelihood that illegal discrimination was involved in the chal-
lenged decision. That likelihood is called into question when
discrimination is defined to exclude all unthinking prejudice.
The shift to an explicit standard of inferred intent that would
cover the unconscious application of racial stereotypes may
thus be needed not merely to broaden disparate treatment
liability but to maintain it.
CONCLUSION
The unthinking use of racial stereotypes continues to be
widespread and is increasingly recognized as a kind of discrim-
ination. Because for a majority of white Americans overt racial
prejudice is no longer socially acceptable, whites rarely ac-
knowledge, even to ourselves, the extent to which racial ste-
reotypes may influence our "personal" feelings about people of
other races. At the same time, by emphasizing purposeful
subjective intent, discrimination law continues to favor the
person who is least conscious of the play of race in her own ac-
tions. In fact, if only conscious acts of individual discrimination
are illegal, the law will encourage people to remain ignorant of
their own feelings and motives in dealings with people of other
races. This is not a recipe for decreasing racial tensions. The
prevalence of unthinking racial prejudice calls for a liability
standard that will sharpen social awareness of all kinds of
discrimination and assign liability when racial stereotypes
form the basis of unfair housing and employment decisions. In
this Note, I have tried to articulate an objective standard of
inferred intent that would create liability for unthinking dis-
crimination in disparate treatment actions under Title VII and




An inferred intent standard can be conceptualized along
the lines of the "ordinary reader" standard applied by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Ragin.15 9 The objective Ragin standard sug-
gests a principled way to define individual discrimination with-
out subjective intent through an assessment of the challenged
action's meaning. Much of the prejudice that now burdens
minority job and housing applicants cannot properly be called
intentional in a purely subjective sense. Yet, all individual
discrimination is intentional, or at least meaningful, in the
message it conveys and its dependence on common social atti-
tudes.
The inferred intent standard is more appropriate for as-
sessing unthinking discrimination than a classic objective
negligence standard would be, because inferred intent pre-
serves the meaningful quality of individual discriminatory
action that is one of its defining characteristics. Also, in keep-
ing with Americans' disavowal of all race prejudice, the in-
ferred intent standard would assign liability for every identi-
fied instance of discrimination. An inferred intent standard of
liability is the practical result of the procedural structure al-
ready used in disparate treatment cases. Explicitly adopting
the inferred intent standard would reconnect both that proce-
dural structure and the legal doctrine of disparate treatment
with the reality of how discrimination functions in the world.
Finally, the only intellectually honest way to preserve an
indirect proof structure in disparate treatment law is to ac-
knowledge that the discriminatory intent that procedural
structure infers is not always conscious. The law must clarify
that the burden shift in discrimination cases is not only appro-
priate because "clever men may easily conceal their motiva-
tionsl)" but because both clever and dull defendants may
discriminate without realizing what they are doing. By adopt-
ing an inferred intent standard, the law can both adapt to the
changing social context in which discrimination operates and
'9 923 F.2d 995.
160 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
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preserve an important procedural structure in discrimination
law that has worked well for over twenty years.
Jessie Allen'61
11 1 am grateful to the following people who read early drafts and provided
substantive critiques: Kristin Bebelaar, Colin Crawford, Michael ladow, Douglas
Schulkind, and Anthony Sebok.
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